With rare exceptions sociologists have traditionally had little to say about the British monarchy. In the exceptional cases of the Durkheimian functionalism of Shils and Young (1953), the left humanism of Birnbaum (1955), or the archaic state/backward nation thesis of Nairn (1988), the British nation has been conceived as a homogenous mass. The brief episode of the Sex Pistols Jubilee year song 'God Save the Queen' exposed some of the divisions within the national 'mass', forcing a re-ordering of the balance between detachment and belonging to the Royal idea. I argue that the song acted as a kind of 'breaching experiment'. Its wilful provocation of Royalist sentiment revealed the level of sanction available to the media-industrial complex to enforce compliance to British self-images of loyal and devoted national communicants.
3 trades in signs rather than physical commodities. CDs are available in the marketplace not simply because they take the form of a silvery coloured disc shape, though this is not unimportant, but because of the culturally meaningful signs that are encoded onto the disc, its packaging and the wider cultural dialogue surrounding its production. But it is also capital, a commodity upon whose sale the music-industrial complex hopes to realise its profits and begin a new round of accumulation. What Simon Frith (1992: 52) argued for the music industry applies to more general processes of cultural production: 'Youth music itself has been routinized, and what matters to the industry in this context is the illusion of change, the illusion necessary for continued sales'.
Today, pop's built-in obsolescence, its slavish devotion to the nearly-new sound and the familiar lyric, helps stabilise tradition and routinise pop's shock value. However, now and then pop rejects the prevailing industry standard and radically posits a different sound and sentiment. My interest here is in one such cultural moment where masses, monarchy, and music collided: the Sex Pistols song 'God Save the Queen'.
While the background may be well known I wish to situate this historically by briefly At the outset they state, 'The heart has its reasons which the mind does not suspect ' (1953: 63) . In other words the 'ordinary people', as they called them, partook of the Coronation ritual in a wholly unreflexive way. People at street parties in the East End of London displayed a 'complete inability to say why they thought important the occasion they were honouring with such elaborate ritual'.
The mystery of the incomprehensible ritual, 'inchoate, dimly perceived and seldom explicit ' (1953: 80) , was readily disclosed as an instance of the universal sacredness of the value structure of society. Only through regular moments of 'national communion' can the irrational desires and hostilities of 'society' be quelled and put under greater values and moral rules, expressed by the very person of the 'great ones'.
In this way 'the preponderance of positive devotion to the moral rules' may be reestablished (1953: 66-7). The Coronation was thus the ceremonial occasion par excellence for 'the affirmation of the moral rules by which the society lives. It was an act of national communion ' (1953: 67) . By giving the 'low ones' some proximity to the 'great ones' the sacredness of moral national consensus is renewed.
By the 1950s, the eminent sociologists explained, the British working class had been tamed by warfare, welfare and regular employment. No longer unruly, violent and hostile towards the symbols of ruling class power working class consciousness had been deeply assimilated 'into the moral consensus of British society … [as] one of the great collective achievements of modern times ' (1953: 76) . Any lingering hostility felt by the working class had been effectively extinguished by their devotion to Elizabeth II as a sacred love-object: 'when love is directed towards a genuinely love-worthy object [it] reduces the intensity of hatred as well ' (1953: 78) . 'Contact with this vessel of the sacred values ' (1953: 80) provided such an intensive feeling of belonging that class hatred could only recede further. In his response to Shils and Young, Norman Birnbaum (1955: 23) balked at any talk of the nationally integrative function of the Coronation, concluding that 'it is a considerable disservice to sociology to present our discipline as a useful handmaiden of the current effort to make a conservative ideology once more orthodox and unquestioned'. For Birnbaum the British working class remained largely unassimilated to middle class values in contrast to the embourgeoisment of the US working class. The value hierarchy between 'the great' and 'the low' is inverted by Birnbaum: the bitter struggles of the labour movement dragged the monarchy and the rest of the ruling class into a properly national moral life for the first time. But later Birnbaum returns to the unassimilated nature of the working class. Precisely the absence of shared values gave the Coronation its special salience as a break from routine, a temporary relief from conflict, and the fascination with the Queen had less to do with reverence, worship and devotion than with the 'cult of adulation built up around certain film stars ' (1955: 19) . This is all grist to the mill of Nairn's thesis that superstructural 'backwardness' reflects the 'backwardness' of society. Thus, despite their crawling, Shils and Young are not entirely mistaken about society being in thrall to archaic institutions like the monarchy. Nairn (1988: 122) scoffs gleefully at the academic politeness of the debate '(where Professors accuse one another of "not entirely escaping ambiguity" and failing to "present events in scientific terms")' and their tacit consensus that the monarchy is really a side-show, alternately 'tinsel revels' or a sacred national altar piece. The anti-modern political authority of the monarchy in its guise as 'constitutional monarch' is, for Nairn, entirely neglected behind the shared phoney dichotomy between 'show and reality'.
Birnbaum's humanist mission of a pure working class, undefiled by the taint of national solidarity, making steady progress towards a more democratic form of life, provokes still more vituperation from Nairn, who dubs Birnbaum's intervention 'the Sociology of Grovelling, Part 2'. After all, the monarchy is 'an archaic institution' and, as such, 'may express something deeply and incorrigibly archaic about the society whose institution it is' (Nairn, 1988: 128) . Not many Marxists would escape censure for the kind of crude base-superstructure model deployed by Nairn. However, Scotland, and took to blowing-up the odd post-box embossed with the new EIIR cipher until the logo was removed from Scotland altogether. the elusive style of his writing often makes it difficult to cut through the thicket in order to arrive at what precisely Nairn's position on the prospects for the monarchy actually is, given that it still reflects a backward society. In any case, when the first edition of Nairn's The Enchanted Glass appeared in 1988 it was deeply marked by the popularity of the monarchy, a popularity which was soon to be reversed in the 1990s, though it is less clear whether society is any less 'backward' now than then.
The Royal balancing act
As Michael Billig (1992) notes many studies misleadingly focus on the glamour, grandeur or spectacle of the monarchy. The daily reproduction of the monarchy is obscured by an exclusive concentration on the meaning and significance of state formality. For one thing the tradition of the royal ceremonial is rich in its capacity for re-invention and adaptation (Cannadine, 1983) . Even more to the point is that the focus on the extraordinary 'one-off' event is the partner to the focus on the personalities and caprice of the 'great ones'. This works to the detriment of a sociological understanding of the everyday 'ordinariness' of the unequal conditions of social life for most of the population in contrast to the unearned fortunes and inherited privileges of the Windsor family.
Other studies, like the Mass Observation [sic] project, have documented the role of and feelings towards the monarchy in the everyday lives of the 'low ones' (Ziegler, 1977) . The popularity of the monarchy tends to be confirmed by social surveys. For instance, less than 9 per cent of respondents to the 1995 British Social Attitudes survey agreed that the monarchy should be abolished while two-thirds thought the monarchy important for Britain and supported the heredity principle of succession (Jowell, et al, 1996: 253) . The figures supporting the monarchy in 1999 were almost identical, indicating a high level of consistency (Jowell, et al, 2000: 294) . This level of support tends to be lower in London and fell to only half in Scotland, suggesting a much weaker attachment to the symbols of Britishness and/or inherited privilege (Jowell, et al, 1996: 13) .
Acceptance of this state of affairs is, for Billig, not as straightforward as 'snapshot' surveys or the mass society perspective suggest. Common sense is arrived at through 'ideological dilemmas', which are argued out by utilising common themes to deal perhaps the final point around which such an operation of enforced compliance could be mounted to stabilise the British monarch's position as a sacred object, embodying the desires and fears of a mythical, unified mass by welding it into a glorious national community. A celebrity brand with an immense PR machine behind it … They are a brilliant metaphor for all that is pretentious, deluded, selfish and insincere with the UK'.
Whether a 'story', 'a brand' or 'a metaphor', nothing is coming into view remotely capable of the breach committed by 'God Save the Queen' twenty-five years ago.
McLaren complains that Jamie Reid's 'Queen' artwork is now sold as a T-shirt in Beverly Hills and is modelled for fashion magazines like Vogue: 'the slogan is now the antithesis of what it originally stood for, and its imaging inadvertently could be said to help promote the brand, the royal family, the "firm" (as the Duke of Edinburgh is so fond of saying -actually a term often used to describe a criminal gang), the
